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Behavioral differences have been reported between conservatives and liberals
when categorizing facial expressions, yet no study explores potential differences in the
manner in which the two groups process facial expressions, let alone how partisanship
contributes or how political engagement may vary with brain processing of facial
expressions. In this context, processing refers to brain patterns following exposure to a
facial expression and participants’ subsequent attention to the presented facial
expressions. This thesis addresses the question of whether political temperament is
associated with differences in neural processing. Research subjects participated in an
emotion discrimination task while event-related potentials (ERP) were captured in order
to explore the neurological processing similarities and differences between conservatives
and liberals (also by accounting for partisanship), and those with varying levels of
participation, in response to the facial expressions of fear, happiness, anger, disgust, and
no emotion (neutral). The findings suggest that, for the P2 component, compared to
liberals, conservatives process facial emotions more rapidly but only for particular
categories of emotion. When including partisanship in a model, more pronounced
differences emerge, with ideology emerging as a factor that captures facial processing
differences irrespective of emotion. In terms of participation, those who tend to

participate less have higher P1 amplitudes, indicating large cognitive resources spent to
process facial information, and also tend to have higher cortisol levels.
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Introduction
The brain is an important frontier for political science research. Although it is
often not understood as such, the brain is central to the dispute over whether, where,
when, and how genes and the environment interact or, at times, impinge one another
when it comes to people’s political attitudes and behaviors. To put it bluntly, the brain is
the powerhouse for all individual political attitudes and behaviors—the brain is
responsible for all behaviors, many of which occur outside the realm of consciousness
(Gazzaniga, 2009; Gazzaniga, 2011). The brain bears the imprints of many forces and it
is incontrovertible that the brain and its activity is an outgrowth of genes, the
environment, the interaction between genes, and the interaction between genes and the
environment (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005; Charney, 2008; Charney & English, 2012;
Gazzaniga, 2009; Gazzaniga, 2011; Luck, 2005; Schreiber, 2011). The brain is a complex
entity composed of intricate functions, structures, and mechanisms and is influenced by
the interactions of genes and the environment.
The brain is increasingly becoming a focus for research. Some previous work in
political science has focused on brain chemicals or neurotransmitters to observe
correlations with political attitudes and behavior (Fowler & Dawes, 2008; Fowler, Baker,
& Dawes, 2008; Charney & English, 2012), while other work has focused on structural
differences (Kanai et al., 2012; Westen et al 2006; Schreiber et al., 2009). Few studies
(Amodio et al., 2007; Inzlicht et al., 2009; Weissflog et al., 2010) have utilized tools to
better understand overall brain processing, especially at the speed which the brain
functions—milliseconds—and how it relates to politically related attitudes and behaviors.
Accordingly, much work remains to explore the neural correlates of political attitudes
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and behaviors and it is appropriate to step back and study brain activity with a different
technique that can capture brain activity at the speed it unfolds (Luck, 2005). This thesis
helps fill that void by exploring changes in brain activity (EEG) in response to an
emotion discrimination task, dissecting potential differences in terms of ideology,
partisanship, and political participation.
The project is divided into three parts. The first section evaluates how brain
activity varies across liberals and conservatives in response to an emotion discrimination
task. Extending the first portion, the second portion engages in both a theoretical and
methodological debate over how ideology manifests itself in brain activity, resulting in
the use of a model that incorporates partisanship. The third section explores how facial
processing is relevant to political participation. In short, ideological differences manifest
themselves in the processing of faces, and there is a relationship between political
participation and processing of faces. The takeaway point is that when it comes to the
brain, its processing is related to participation and ideology. The processing differences in
the brain are not merely associated with ideology or participation, however. This research
makes room for more complexity and shows that partisanship is an important contributor
to brain processing differences.
Perhaps one of the most provoking findings of this body of work is how costly,
both in terms of attention and cognitive resources, it is to process faces for those who
tend to participate less in politics. For a long time, rational choice evaluations of voting
and other iterations of it have suggested that those who do not participate find the costs
too high and, if not forthrightly, imply there is an emotional detachment from politics
amongst low participators. Processing facial expressions—perhaps one of the most

3
fundamental pieces of human interaction— requires much brain activity for low
participators. This finding then potentially provides a great deal of insight, suggesting
low participators spend more cognitive resources to process basic social information,
which might explain why they avoid politics, an innately social process.
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Faces—A Valuable Source of Information
Evaluating facial expressions is pivotal for guiding individuals through their
dynamic and complicated interactions with each other. Evaluating facial expressions
provides cues about underlying emotional states or dispositions, and is used to uncover
and to verify what others are thinking, feeling, and saying (Hassin & Trope, 2000).
Humans interpret threat, trustworthiness, joy, anger, sadness, and other emotions from
each other’s faces because it allows for a measure of predictiveness in social interactions
and enables them to better adapt to social situations (Engell et al., 2007; Zebrowitz &
Montepare, 2008). People are capable of making such interpretations very quickly;
exposure to a facial expression for as little as 33 milliseconds is enough to make reliable
judgments about trustworthiness, competence, and aggression (Engell et al., 2007;
Todorov, Pakrashi, & Oosterhof, 2009). The importance of facial expressions for
conveying such socially useful information is universal; irrespective of culture, people
are adept at recognizing faces as expressing the same emotion (Campanella et al., 2002;
Hassin & Trope, 2000) and humans develop the skill to interpret and recognize faces at a
very young age (Wong et al., 2009). By no coincidence, facial information is incredibly
salient, evidenced by the fact that faces are given processing priority when nested in
complex presentations rife with other emotionally significant, potential distractors
(Palermo & Rhodes, 2007). Put simply, facial expressions are a valuable source of
information, selected over many other stimuli and kinds of information, that help form
thoughts and guide people’s interactions.
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In Politics, Faces Matter
Politics is, at its core, a social activity (Putnam, 2001), so it is of little surprise that
facial expressions can provide important cues for deconstructing a political environment.
Media, citizens, interest groups, and other actors process politicians’ facial expressions in
order to match politicians’ words with their emotions, craft narratives about candidates to
inform political choice, and generally to make evaluations about personality, competence,
health, intelligence and trustworthiness (Westen, 2008; Popkin, 1994; Todorov 2008;
Willis & Todorov 2006; Todorov et al., 2005). From candidates’ appearances, people
draw inferences, particularly about candidates’ competence, and these inferences predict
election outcomes better than chance (Todorov et al., 2005; Ballew & Todorov, 2007;
Olivia & Todorov, 2010; Spezio et al., 2008). As a whole, these findings suggest the way
people process faces is pertinent to their political thoughts and behaviors.
The brain is the processing center, and is a central component in exploring the
potential differences in political attitudes and behaviors. Generally, human reactions are
the product of the environment and physiology such that the “body is the medium of
experience and the instrument of action” (Miller, 1978, 79). People intake sensory input
from their environment and then translate that information to form a behavioral output in
a way that is both biological and physical (Kreibig, 2010; Wagner & Silber, 2004). The
brain is not only involved in but is also responsible for this process: it translates and
transmits information, as well as stimulates bodily responses, in the form of a series of
electrical impulses (Luck, 2005). Because these electrical charges reflect interpretation,
evaluation, and dissemination of information, it means these electrical signals may
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illuminate the potential processing differences between liberals and conservatives and
across those with varying levels of political participation.
This electrical activity can be measured by using event-related potentials. Eventrelated potentials (ERPs) measure electrical brain activity before, during, and after a
behavioral response to an event. ERPs are compiled from averaging
electroencephalograms (EEG) across many trials in response to discrete events, such as
stimulus onset. The advantage of measuring the electrical impulses with ERPs is that it
offers a continuous measure of cognitive processing that is time-locked to stimuli and
responses to them (Luck, 2005, 21). Put differently, by using ERPs to measure brain
activity, it is possible to directly and progressively measure changes in brain activity as
they are affected by experimental conditions. Brain activity is also summative (Hardy,
2004; Luck, 2005), so although brain activity occurs rapidly (in milliseconds), processing
stages involve increasingly active portions of the brain that contribute to the way people
process information. ERPs make it possible to gauge brain activity as participants view
facial expressions, thereby providing leverage to investigate processing differences.
Overall, this line of work fits well with the different proposals of information
processing proposed previously by political scientists. Lau and Redlawsk (2001) and
Lodge, Taber, and Verhulst (2011) suggest affect matters as people process information.
Affect becomes infused in individuals’ processing and it undergirds the conclusions
people reach. Although it is possible to debate whether it is affect imbued in memory, the
situation, or both, which directs people’s decision-making and information gathering. The
current project acknowledges that much of the processing in the brain is not conscious
and recognizes that affect may differentially impact brain processing, turning on the
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affect of the stimulus as well as individual processing differences (Gazzaniga, 2011;
Luck, 2005; Lodge, Taber, & Verhulst, 2011). Nonetheless, this project attempts to tease
out portions of the brain wave when mere automaticity is most at issue and when more
levels of the brain (top-down) become engaged when presented with affect (emotion).
How Processing Faces Relates to Ideological Differences
Though people are skilled at evaluating the facial expressions of others, this does
not necessarily mean all people respond and attend to facial expressions the same way.
Given the various divides between liberals and conservatives in their general outlooks on
life (Pinker, 2002), moral foundations (Haidt & Graham, 2007), orientations
(Hetherington and Weiler, 2009), motivated social cognitions (Jost et al., 2003),
preferences concerning stability and certainty (Jost et al., 2003; Oxley et al., 2008),
general communications (Lakoff, 2002), brain structures (Kanai et al., 2010), and
cognitive styles (Amodio et al., 2007; Schreiber et al., 2009; Westen et al., 2006; Dodd et
al., 2012), it is quite clear that liberals and conservatives observe the political and social
world through different lenses and that these lenses lead to different reactions to social
information. Although the previously mentioned literature does not examine how liberals
and conservatives process facial expressions, the works collectively suggest liberals and
conservatives react differently to social information, which likely extends to facial
expressions.
An example of how liberals and conservatives react differently to information can
be found in Dodd et al. (2012), which showed that conservatives quickly attended to and
dwelled on more aversive (negative) images than liberals. This means even when
presented with the same information, conservatives pay attention and react to the
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information differently than liberals. Moreover, because the researchers used eyetracking, this suggests, at minimum, there are some automatic differences in the ways
liberals and conservatives attend to information.
Vigil (2010) finds that, when given ambiguous facial stimuli, conservatives tend
to interpret the stimuli as dominant or expressing the emotions of anger or disgust,
whereas liberals are more likely to interpret the same facial stimuli as nonthreatening or
submissive, and as emoting joy, sadness, or surprise. Thus, political ideology appears to
be a marker for differences in the way individuals react to and attend to facial
information. Vigil (2010) is the only work that looks at the relationship between ideology
and facial expressions, but it does not address whether liberals and conservatives process
facial expressions differently. Given their different perceptions of the same face, it is
almost a certainty they do. Behavioral outputs depend on the processing differences that
structure them. Further, processing in this sense refers to the potential motor, sensory,
and cognitive processes that lend themselves to an overall behavioral difference. In short,
processing differences feed behavioral differences and by using the paradigm in this
paper, it becomes possible to understand when and where these processing differences
manifest themselves and give rise to an explanation for varied behavior. Accordingly, the
central goal of the research here is to document the nature of these processing
differences. This portion of the project compares and contrasts the overall brain activity
of liberals and conservatives over time and across five different experimental conditions:
the facial expressions of fear, anger, happiness, and sadness, as well as faces devoid of
emotion (neutral).
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Brain Activity Related to Facial Expressions
Because of the importance of processing facial expressions, scholars interested in
social cognition, psychology, and neuroscience have sought to understand how brain
activity fluctuates after being presented with facial stimuli. Studies on this point,
generally, have found that people processing facial information use similar brain
pathways as they do when processing other salient emotional information such as
provocative pictures (for a review, see Eimer & Holmes, 2007). Facial information is
emotional in nature because the emotional circuitry of the brain becomes involved during
processing facial information. However, multiple areas of the brain—the frontal cortex,
the frontal lobe including the inferior and dorsolateral regions, superior temporal sulcus,
inferior occipital cortex, middle fusiform gyrus, anterior cingulate cortex, and amygdala
and orbitofrontal cortex—are involved in processing facial expressions and this poses a
challenge for untangling which portions of the brain are active and for what processes, let
alone uncovering their interactions (Engell et al., 2007; Said, Haxby, & Todorov, 2011).
Despite what may seem commonplace and trivial to most of us as we function on a daily
basis, the processing of facial expressions is an intricate process, involving many
functions—recognition, identification and evaluation of the face—which rely on various
regions of the brain and correspond to increasing levels of brain activity. Accordingly,
many neural pathways likely become active following exposure to facial expressions and
for different reasons and functions (Campanella et al., 2002; Eimer & Holmes, 2002,
2007; Engell et al., 2007; Said, Haxby, & Todorov, 2011). Facial expressions are rapidly
processed and that expressions are important cues for both social interaction and
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decision-making (Campanella et al., 2002; Eimer & Holmes, 2002, 2007; Kotchoubey,
2002).
The Effect of Facial Expressions on Brain Waves
Scholars have discerned stages of processing that occur over time following
exposure to different facial expressions. There is no exact time that corresponds to the
processing of facial information; rather, there are pertinent epochs, or temporal windows,
of brain activity that follow exposure to facial information. This has led scholars to focus
on particular portions of subjects’ brainwaves following exposure to visual sensory
stimuli. Three specific ERP components1 of interest in this project are the P1, N170, and
P2.2 A complete review of all the ERP components relevant to processing facial stimuli is
beyond the scope of this study. Particular ERP components are selected in this section
because they are focused on in the facial (emotional) processing literature and contribute
to the ensuing analysis in this project.
P1 refers to the first positive moving wave following visual stimulus onset. It
typically surfaces at the lateral occipital electrode sites and peaks between 100-130
milliseconds after stimulus onset (Luck, 2005). Nearly thirty visual areas of the brain can
contribute to this component, which is why it is considered as sensory-level processing
(Luck, 2005; Channon & Hopfinger, 2011). Few studies have shown individual variations
in the P1, with the prominent exception being that those with higher anxiety have higher
amplitudes—meaning that, as a group, they have an automatic attentional bias prompting

1	
  ERP

components are given labels, like above, that refer to their specific polarity and position in the
wave.To visualize what is being discussed, please view to the results section, which shows the ERP
waveform.	
  
2
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them to over attend to most stimuli (Mueller et al., 2009). Generally, the P1 is considered
to reflect initial, obligatory automatic processing, which occurs early on in the wave.
The N170 is a distinct wave that refers to a negative deflection following stimulus
onset, which typically surfaces at the parietal cortex and the lateral occipital cortex and
peaks between 150-200 milliseconds. The N170 component is sensitive to facial stimuli
(Eimer, Holmes, & McGlone, 2003). At minimum, the N170 is a sign of “discriminative
processing of some sort,” and, in this context, that means the human brain can distinguish
faces from other objects by this time in the ERP wave (Eimer, Holmes, & McGlone,
2003; Luck, 2005, 31). Still, the N170 is best considered as an early phase of face
processing (Sreenivasan, Goldstein, Lustig, Rivas, & Jha, 2009) and there is conflicting
evidence for whether the N170 is sensitive to specific emotional expressions (Batty &
Taylor, 2003; Eimer et al., 2003; Luo et al., 2010). Generally speaking, the N170 reflects
a process that distinguishes emotion from neutral.
The P2 component is a distinct wave that follows the N170 component. Although
the P2 component originates at anterior and central portions of the brain, the wave is also
discernable in posterior regions (Luck, 2005). Following stimulus onset, the P2 appears
around 200 milliseconds and continues thereafter. The post-stimulus activity of the P2 is
considered to reflect higher level stages of facial expression processing, including the
emotional content of the faces, which also means higher order, top-down cognitive
functions may influence this ERP component (Eimer & Holmes, 2007). This also means
individual differences may be more likely to impact processing at this stage (Hajack et
al., 2012). The P2 is elongated and does not have a steep slope relative to the N170 and
P1, suggesting people are devoting more attention to or are more slowly processing the
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stimulus at this stage (Luck, 2005). The P2 component may unveil specific emotional
differences because it is influenced by attentional resource allocation differences (Petroni
et al., 2011).
Given the above, I hypothesize that differences will not materialize at either the
P1 or N170 stages because they simply occur too early for emotion discrimination
differences due to ideological sources. Given its relevance to emotion discrimination in
the literature and the potential top-down influences stemming from individual
differences, much attention is focused on the P2 component in this thesis. The specific
nature of the expected differences between liberals and conservatives on the P2
component is an interesting matter and likely varies from emotion to emotion. The
findings by Vigil (2010) stress differences between liberals and conservatives in their
responses to dominant (angry, happy, disgusted) as opposed to submissive (fearful, sad,
surprised) facial expressions, with conservatives being more attuned to dominant
expressions. This being the case, it is expected that conservatives at the P2 stage will
process dominant (but not submissive) facial expressions more quickly than liberals. An
alternative set of expectations focuses on the distinction between negative (disgusted,
angry, fearful) facial expressions as opposed to positive (happy) facial expressions.
Given that Dodd et al. (2012) find that conservatives are quicker to dwell on (and more
attentive to) negative images, it could also be that conservatives at the P2 stage process
negative facial expressions more quickly.
Research Design
In the summer of 2010, a professional survey organization, using a mix of
landline and cell phone numbers, generated a random sample of individuals from eastern
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Nebraska that was then used to recruit 340 participants to come to a research lab for a 90
minute exercise. In return, they were promised a participant fee of $50. After obtaining
consent, the participants completed a computer survey about their political beliefs,
personality, and demographic information. During this survey, the participants were
asked if they were willing to be involved in subsequent projects scheduled for later in the
summer. The ERP portion of the experiment drew a smaller group from the pool of the
340 participants who indicated a willingness to return for further testing (approximately
85 percent of the original sample). Beyond willingness to return, eligible ERP
participants also had to be right-hand dominant (standard procedure in order to control
for hemispheric influences in brain activity) and they needed to affirm that they did not
have medical conditions that could interfere with ERP data collection (neurological
disorders, MS, etc.). Finally, they needed to be available during the time when
participants were being processed in the second wave.
Accordingly, 104 participants were processed in the EEG portion of the project.
Following previous ERP work on politics (see Amodio et al., 2007), political orientation
was measured using a 5-point ideology scale where 1=Strong Liberal and 5=Strong
conservative. We then classified those participants who self-reported a 1 or 2 on this
scale as liberals, and those who self-reported a 4 or 5 as conservatives. High-quality ERP
data were obtained from 83 participants; 10 of these self-reported a 3 on the ideology
scale (i.e., they identified as non-ideologues) and were excluded from our analysis given
the project’s focus on liberals and conservatives. The final sample includes 31 liberals
and 42 conservatives (53.5 percent female). People’s age in the sample ranges from 1965, with a mean of 46.11 (standard deviation of 12.84). All people in the sample had
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completed high school and close to half (45.8%) had completed at least some college,
while the rest of the sample completed college or some kind of graduate degree. Almost a
third (31.3%) reported making less than $40,000 per year and nearly 40 percent (42.2%)
made $80,000 or more, with the rest between $40,000 and $80,000.
Once in the lab, each participant had a 128-channel Geodesic Sensor Net placed
on his or her head, which recorded the electroencephalogram (EEG). The 128 Geodesic
Sensor Net has unique advantages relative to other collection tools in that it does not need
a ground to control for exogenous electrical activity and is recognized in the field for its
use in collecting clean data—the net helps reduce random noise while capturing research
participants’ electrical activity. Participants’ head size was measured before their arrival
to the lab, and once again before the net was placed on them. Head measurements were
taken to mark the vertex (center-most point) of the participant’s head, so that the
reference electrode could be properly located. Identifying the vertex is an important
procedure because the other leads are positioned relative to this point on the head, and the
recorded voltages are referenced from the vertex electrode. The net was pre-soaked in a
mild saline solution—warmed, distilled water mixed with a sodium electrolyte (NaCl)
and a drop of baby shampoo to enhance conductivity with the scalp and the participants’
comfort. This technique also helped remove hair gels, sprays, and other debris that dry
the sensors and inhibit connectivity with the scalp. Once the net was in place, the net was
connected to an analogue amplifier, which collects and amplifies the electrical signals
being captured by the net’s sensors.
While wearing the net, the participants engaged in an emotion discrimination task,
in which numerous still images were presented to participants in a randomized order.
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Each image appeared for a half second (500 ms) followed by an inter-stimulus interval (a
blank screen), randomized to appear from 750 ms to 1250 ms, before the next image
would appear. The images were of 41 male and female faces emoting happiness, anger,
fear, and neutral facial expressions. These images came from the NimStim database and
have been externally validated to ensure that the faces express the claimed emotion (see
Appendix for examples). Gender and race were counter-balanced to preclude these from
becoming potentially confounding variables. The images appeared during 410 stimulus
trials (41 models x 5 faces x 2), meaning each face was displayed 2 times. The images
were displayed in the center of the screen of a 19-inch computer monitor, with the
participant seated and facing the computer from approximately 60 cm away. The
participants were instructed to press one of four buttons, which corresponded to the four
expressions—happiness, anger, fear, and disgust. All participants were instructed to
respond to all faces and follow their best judgment for selecting what expression the face
emoted. This means that participants were asked to determine what emotional expression
was emoted even when there was not one (neutral faces). E-Prime software, which is
standard for these experiments, was used to present the images and record participants’
behavioral responses to the stimuli.
Before recording EEG data for the emotion discrimination task, electrode
impedances were recorded and adjusted to less than 50 kilohms. The procedure helps
ensure the electrodes have a good connection with the participant’s scalp, which helps
minimize external noise that can be recorded by the equipment that has nothing to do
with the research participant’s brain activity in response to the stimulus. Also, a filter was
applied to remove electrical noise (50 Hz and above). Following this calibration period,
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EEG recordings were continuously sampled at 250 Hz for the task. This means brain
activity was measured every 4 milliseconds.
ERPs were derived from the raw EEG in subsequent data processing following
the experiment. Eye-blinks and other movements interfering with ERP data were marked
and corrected using a standard averaging procedure, which took the average of the
electrical signal of the sensors nearby and replaced the bad signal with that average and
calculated out the external noise that the net measured. Two brain activity measures for
each identified component were taken from the averaged ERPs from each individual
participant: peak amplitude, measured in microvolts (uV), is the maximum or minimum
voltage of a wave form; and latency, measured in milliseconds, is the time following
stimulus onset at which the peak occurs.
To assess the manner in which conservatives and liberals process faces, a mixed
group factorial ANCOVA was performed. Mixed group factorial ANCOVA is an ideal
statistical analysis to apply to these data because it compares and contrasts variation that
occurs within and between groups—in this case, the effect of ideology and the effects of
faces—of participants who experienced the same experimental conditions, while holding
other variables constant.
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Figure 1: Sensor Regions Employed in this Study

This image provides a general picture of the sensor clusters selected and used for
analysis. Individual and Grand Average data were reviewed to inform these sensor
selections.
Analysis indicated the particular regions most appropriate for investigation over
posterior regions of the scalp (see Figure 1). Hemispheric effects were absent so the
relevant regions in each hemisphere were averaged together for each particular measure.
Also by way of preliminaries, the effects of gender, age, education, and income for each
emotion for all of the ERP components were examined. Income and education neither
correlated nor contributed to the models so those variables are not included as controls.
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Age and gender, however, are included as controls because they did correlate and/or
contribute to the models.

Figure 2: Wave Forms for Categories of Faces, All Participants
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In order to provide a sense of the P1, N170, and P2 components, Figure 2 shows
the amplitudes for all participants for each of the five categories of facial expressions.
The P1, N170, and P2 components are clearly visible. Also observable is the absence of
difference across emotions at P1. Differences between peak amplitude responses to
emotions and neutral surface at N170 but show no latency differences. More marked
differences appear in P2.
Turning to potential processing differences between liberals and conservatives,
using the Greenhouse-Geisser sphericity assumptions, as hypothesized for the P1
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component, no interactions were found between the emotions and political ideology
(F(3.354, 231.425)=.407, p=.770, MSe=8.964), or main effects for emotion (F(3.354,
231.425)=1.229, p=.30, MSe=8.964) or ideology (F(1, 69)=.074, p=.786). Similarly, for
the N170 component, also as hypothesized, the mixed groups factorial ANCOVA
supports the null and shows that there are no interactions between the emotions and
ideology F(3.502, 241.631)=1.475, p=.216, MSe=14.967) or a main effect of ideology
F(1, 69)=.550, p=.461) or emotion (F(3.502, 241.631)=1.461, p=.667, MSe=14.967).
The story is quite different for the P2 component. Here the mixed groups ANCOVA, as
hypothesized, shows an interaction between ideology and emotion (F(3.649,
251.757)=2.788, p=.031), and, by using LSD follow-up minimum mean difference
analyses (p=.05), shows that liberals and conservatives differently respond to particular
emotions. No main effects of emotion (F(3.649, 251.757)=.542, p=.705, MSe=73.171) or
ideology (F(1, 69)=.977, p=.326, MSe= 679.199) were found.
Figure 3 graphically presents the mean peak latency of the P2 component for
liberals and conservatives. Indeed, the results show that conservatives do tend to respond
faster than liberals across the various categories of facial expressions but the pattern is
not entirely straightforward. The P2 latency for conservatives is less than that of liberals
for four of the five expressions and statistically significant for three of those four. For
only one type of expression (fear) does the pattern run in the other direction and that
relationship is not significant. Disgust expressions generate reduced latency in
conservatives but not at the p<.05 level. This particular pattern across emotions is in
keeping with predictions and previous research. Vigil (2010) suggests conservatives are
sensitive to dominant emotions (happiness, anger, and disgust) so it is reasonable to
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hypothesize that conservatives will also process those emotions the most quickly and, as
indicated by our results, this expectation holds for the most part. In addition, because
conservatives are prone to see neutral faces as expressing dominant emotions, it is
important to note that the results show that conservatives process angry, happy, and
neutral faces faster than liberals—meaning neutral is processed similar to dominant
emotions. The images employed in the study only included one category of submissive
faces (fearful) and this is indeed the one category for which liberals seemed to process
more quickly, though not significantly so. The fact that conservatives process neutral
faces more rapidly than liberals is a surprising and interesting finding that deserves
further testing. These results provide less support for the hypothesis that differences
across the ideological spectrum with regard to processing speed will be seen between
negative and positive facial expressions. The dominant-submissive distinction seems to
have better traction.
Figure 3: Mean Conservative and Liberal Responses (in milliseconds) to Facial
Stimuli in the P2 Component
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Conclusion
With respect to the P1 and N170 components, the findings suggest little
difference in the way conservatives and liberals initially process information, an expected
finding given the early and nearly automatic nature of these components, especially the
P1; however, differences between liberals and conservatives appear in the P2 component
and indicate that, compared to liberals, conservatives process dominant emotions more
quickly. These results can be seen as roughly consistent with previous research finding
that conservatives are more attentive to dominant emotions such as anger, happiness, and
disgust (Vigil, 2010). In a broader sense, these results are consistent with a growing body
of literature identifying deeper personality, cognitive, and physiological differences
across the ideological spectrum (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005; Amodio et al., 2007;
Dodd et al., 2012; Gerber et al., 2010; Gruszczynski et al., 2012; Jost et al., 2003; Kanai
et al., 2011; Madsen, 1985, 1986; Mondak, 2010; Oxley et al., 2008; Schreiber et al.,
2009; Smith et al., 2011; Westen et al., 2006). Like that research, it is important to note
that identifying differences across the ideological spectrum is not tantamount to labeling
one ideological group as superior to another. Processing dominant emotions at the P2
stage either more quickly or more slowly is not indicative of a character flaw. The results
do suggest, however, that there are deep biological markers for political ideology,
markers that appear not just in answers to survey items but also in physiological
predispositions, cognitive tendencies, and brain activation patterns in response to
emotional faces.
This project’s finding situates itself well within the field. Different paradigms
have been advanced on how individuals update and use information (Lodge et al., 2011;
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Lau & Redlawsk, 2001), in keeping with that literature, facial information influences
ideologues’ information processing. The story is not clean cut, however, with the
relationship between ideology and processing of emotion being contingent on both the
ideology and emotion in question.
Another illuminating consideration for the broader political science literature is
that the differences extolled in this project are at the not conscious stage even though, as
indicated, selective attention differences can occur and do matter. Information processing
of the most basic, and perhaps crucial element of interpersonal discourse and
interaction—faces—exposes these differences. This project’s findings point to the fact
that as automatic processing continues (bottom-up), it envelops higher order processing
(top-down), and differences such as ideology matters in how people selectively, though
automatically, processes information.
On a general level, it is important to consider the nature of this experiment and its
implications for the issue at hand—the nexus between facial processing and behavior
differences for ideology. Ideological differences have long been studied on a behavioral
or attitudinal level. However, these results show that when the behavior is treated as a
constant—observing only correct categorization (responses) to the expressed emotion—
processing differences emerge. Accordingly, this finding encourages going beyond
studying behavior, because the underlying processing that structures behavior varies for
liberals and conservatives. In this case, if only the behavior is considered—conservatives
and liberals correctly discriminated the face—a source of differences not observable on
the behavioral level is overlooked. The takeaway then is this line of research potentially
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opens a new vista for explanation of the similarities and differences of liberals and
conservatives.
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Accounting For Ideology and Partisanship
As the previous chapter demonstrates, ideology helps illuminate variation in
processing of facial information. Although this is a valuable finding and contribution, the
previous section did not test if ideology contributes to processing of faces within a fuller,
more robust model. This portion of the project addresses that possibility by including
partisanship. The overarching argument is that ideology and partisanship are both
psychological motivations and they relate to one another, especially in the respect that
they both refer to people’s interpretation and interaction with the political world—both
are tied to information processing. Since both ideology and partisanship are given
meaning by people and that meaning can be mutually reinforcing, it is important to
evaluate the manner in which ideology alongside partisanship might contribute to the
processing of facial information.
It is clear there is individual variation in ideology, including between those
individuals who share an ideology. Even though ideologically similar people share what
structures their beliefs, variation remains between ideological similar people. Shared
belief systems are not the same thing as equivalent use or equivalent motivations that lead
to adoption of a particular ideology (Jost & Amodio, 2012; Jost, 2009; Jost et al., 2009).
This is important because, although ideology is shared with others, ideology also
becomes a self-embodied and empowering concept that further guides, empowers, and
becomes entrenched in human thought and action as people interpret the political world
(Gazzaniga, 2011; Jost et al., 2009; Jost & Amodio, 2012; Amodio et al., 2007).
Although much research has been devoted to studying the socially motivated
cognitive framework of ideology, it is important to realize that this framework advances a
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conception of how people of different ideologies view the world and to what kinds of
information they pay attention (Jost & Amodio, 2012). Equally relevant, partisanship is
used to explain how people acquire and use information (Federico & Goren, 2009).
Partisanship is viewed as how people look to and evaluate the current political
environment with their ideology or draw from party cues (Campbell et al., 1960; LewisBeck et al., 2008; Federico & Goren, 2009; Fiorina et al., 2006). Despite their links to
one another, ideology and partisanship are entwined but not interchangeable. This line of
argument aligns with others who consider partisanship as psychological attachment or
motivation (Campbell et al., 1960; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008). This project argues ideology
is a belief system shared by groups of individuals who may have variation in what
motivates that system and that those individual variations may also become embedded in
patterns of information processing. Meanwhile, it is important to account for additional
sources of how people may dissect information in the political world like partisanship.
The point of this next portion of this project is not to undercut what was done above, but
to advance it by modeling for a more complex reality by including a measure of
partisanship in the model in order to ask if ideology contributes to processing of facial
information in a fuller model.
Ideology is a framework of political attitudes and beliefs, meaning that it is
important to consider how that framework gains traction amongst those sharing an
ideology and then how this framework can become a potent motivation. Ideology is more
than a mere belief system. It is a potent motivational force capable of structuring human
thought and action (Jost et al., 2003; Jost & Amodio 2012). Ideology has been one of the
most elusive concepts studied in political science, but has been generally treated as belief
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system, with its evaluation turning on constraint and the cohesiveness (and
inconsistencies) of beliefs (Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992; Jost et al., 2003; Jost, 2006;
Jost & Amodio, 2012; Knight, 2006). A common endpoint regarding these findings
questions the value and use of ideology as a way for understanding people’s attitudes and
beliefs (Althaus, 2000; Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992; Jost, 2006) which is further
subdivided into debates over abstract ideology and concrete ideology (Free & Cantril,
1967; Page & Shapiro, 1992; Jost et al., 2009; Zaller, 1992). Rather than treat these
findings as corrosive to the concept of ideology, it is more important to take away that
political attitudes and beliefs vary on the individual level and amongst those who share
that ideology. Ideology may not perfectly and similarly structure all of the attitudes and
beliefs shared by those who hold it, but it is still quite meaningful (Jost, 2006).
Recent work clarifies there are underlying differences that produce ideology,
providing an explanation for why there is variation amongst those who hold an ideology
(Jost et al., 2003). It is not ideology itself that structures or guides people’s attitudes and
beliefs; there is also an undergirding structure of ideology which is fixed by two
dimensions, a dualistic approach to social change (promoting or resisting) and equality
(rejecting versus accepting), that collectively form a motivated social cognition (Jost et
al., 2003). Although other prominent work suggests ideology stems from moral
foundations (Grahman & Haidt, 2007; Haidt, 2012), personality (Mondak, 2010), basic
values (Schwartz et al., 2010), and genetics (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005), the general
point is the same which is that underlying individual motivations, needs, and genetic
elements—many of which are outside the realm of consciousness—fuse to structure and
pull someone toward adopting a particular ideology. The previous bodies of work focus
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on where ideology comes from. This project’s focus is not on from where ideology hails
or the personality, cognitive or motivational dispositions that draw someone toward
adopting an ideology. This project accepts those arguments and findings, and turns to
focus on the variability in the way ideology is structured and used, and once someone
adopts an ideology, it can morph into a motivational source when it comes to the human
mind. In short, a model attempting to explain the neurocorrelates of ideology must
recognize both the multifaceted nature of ideology as well as the potential of variation of
its use alongside other factors known to impact information processing, all of which
come to shape the mind and information processing.
Ideology is a motivational force because it serves underlying dispositions—
personal, existential, and epistemic needs. Ideology serves to minimize uncertainty,
establish order, and provide understanding in the political world (Jost et al., 2003; Jost &
Amodio, 2012). In essence, ideology is a way to seize on and handle information while
also meeting people’s individual and group needs and guiding their experiences in the
political world (Jost et al., 2003). Because variability remains in how these undergirding
dispositions and motivations structure ideology, a concern may be that this structure
applies most, if not only, to the ideological extremes (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). More
evidence, however, has illuminated that ideological extremity does not account for or,
when controlled for, washes away the relationship between the motivational sources and
ideology (Jost et al., 2007). Recently, it was further proposed that ideology, like religion,
joins people and enhances security and solidarity amongst those of like minds (Jost et al.,
2009). Importantly, although ideology may serve needs of people, it does not follow that
each ideology serves those needs equivalently across ideological groups (Jost & Amodio,
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2012). This is an important observation because ideology then fulfills differential
psychological needs across the groups and even within groups, even though those needs
are more similar within an ideological group.
While work on ideology has been validated on many grounds and across cultures,
it still remains possible that even though ideology may be something that binds groups of
individuals together, it falls short when attempting to capture its motivations and use, all
of which may lead to different behaviors and information processing patterns (LewisBeck et al., 2008; Jost et al., 2009; Jost & Amodio, 2012). Put simply, ideology—no
matter its origin—is not an all-encompassing concept. There are subsets of people within
each ideology and their use of ideology varies, which can lead to differences in
conservatives’ and liberals’ interpretations and behaviors (Jost et al., 2009; Lewis-Beck
et al., 2008). Clearly, there is no evidence that ideology is the sole medium by which
people acquire, process, and react to information. In fact, as highlighted above and what
follows, multiple elements contribute to what ideology is and how it is used.
It is also important to briefly note that many have taken issue with the
unidimensionality of ideology, or self-placement on the ideological scale, because of the
large degree of heterogeneity in people’s attitudes within a given ideology (see generally,
Feldman & Johnson, 2009). Ideology has been a strong predictor of attitudes and
behaviors (Feldman & Johnson, 2009; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008). Rather than become
enveloped by this debate, a reasonable conclusion is ideology is necessary but
insufficient for understanding how people are attached to and use their belief systems and
process information.
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Partisanship as a Correlate of Information Processing
Partisanship has long been recognized as a source of information in the political
world, both in the form of how someone uses it in conjunction with their ideology or in
relation to how people process cues from political elites (Campbell et al., 1960; LewisBeck et al., 2008; Fiorina, 2005). In this respect, partisanship is both a source of
information and a way of processing information; it is also a strong psychological
motivator (Campbell et al., 1960; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008). In fact, the potency of
ideology and partisan identification stems from the meaning people give them— strong
conservatives give their ideology different meaning than do other ideological groups
(Feldman & Johnson, 2009). Previous scholars have proffered that party identification
reflected some kind of “affective orientation” to the group (Lewis-Beck et al., 2008;
Campbell, et al., 1960), which fits nicely with Jost et al.’s (2003) framework of ideology
as motivated social cognition. Not only does partisanship enhance understanding of the
way people might collect and process information, but also it meets some emotional
needs. Partisan identification fosters in-group attachments, which has an important
impact on ideology (Devine, 2011). Devine (2011) shows that an ideological identity
exists such that as people become more attached to their partisan identity, it strengthens
the connection to their ideology, almost as a reinforcement mechanism. In other words,
there is a strong relationship between partisan attachment and ideological attachment, but
it is not necessarily reciprocal across all of the groups when considering in the context of
Feldman and Johnson’s (2009) finding. Thus, ideology and partisanship are intertwined
motivations that vary across individuals and groups of individuals.
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By accepting ideology as a motivating social cognition, it follows that this opens
the door to other motivating forces, especially other kinds of psychological attachments,
which may tighten or loosen the bonds of ideology on the behavior of the individual or
how they process information. Specifically, this conclusion is shaped by the following
theory and findings outlined above: (1) ideology and partisanship are psychological
motivations; (2) they are related to one another and even have a reinforcing effect on one
another (but in different ways for those in and across ideological groups); and, lastly, (3)
ideology and partisanship both function as a source and motivator for information
processing and gathering. Accordingly, partisanship is relevant and should be considered
when attempting to understand how those of particular ideologies interpret and interact
with the social world.
Prior to testing this argument, it is salient to consider how the beliefs can become
ingrained in brain functionality. The brain, as suggested above, is structured by
experience, but it is also influenced by people’s attitudes and beliefs: “there is a
cacophony of influences that guide our behavior and judgments” (Gazzaniga, 2011, 179).
To simplify his argument, Gazzaniga (2011) posits the brain is structured by both
experience and genetics, suggesting that people are not simply “hardwired” so that they
are subject to the chemical substructure and genetic architecture of their brains. He
concludes multiple influences, internal and external, lead to people’s thoughts and
behaviors. The conclusion then is people’s experiences, the way they experience the
world, can be a driving force in reshaping their brain.
There are many different explanations for the shaping of people’s brains but,
perhaps, the following example will contextualize and cement the meaning of this
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discussion. The process of “binding” (Gazzaniga, 2011; Shermer, 2011) gives insight into
how neural networks form and perform specific functions. The brain is the processing
center, which means it is responsible for integrating a plethora of information, gathered
from the senses, as well as for the neurochemical process which gives rise to people’s
ability to stream together what they experience and even what they think. The
connections span from a single neuron all the way, for example, to the fusiform face area,
an area of the brain (fusiform gyrus) that is responsible for facial recognition. Neurons
develop and grow together—bind—resulting in a network that can fire for specific
purposes. A certain set of neurons fire when a person sees and recognizes say their
grandmother, which is also imbued with affect for how that person feels about their
grandmother (Gazzaniga, 2011; Shermer, 2011). This phenomena occurs with politicians
as well (Shermer, 2011), who found processing differences when people were presented
with morphed pictures of President Obama. Inzlicht et al. (2009) found processing
differences regarding religiosity, meaning intensity of religious beliefs give rise to
processing differences—the implication here is the intensity of beliefs help form the mind
and the way it processes information. There is strong evidence that automatic processing
occurs and is manifested in brain activity, but this turns not simply on genetics and
experiences but also on beliefs and behaviors. People with different belief systems have
different brain information processing as indicated above and by other research (Amodio
et al., 2007; Inzlicht et al., 2009; Weissflog et al., 2010). Moreover, this processing may
be moderated by the kind and strength of attachment to a belief system.
Given what is discussed above, I hypothesize ideology will still contribute to
processing, such that processing differences between liberals and conservatives will
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remain within a model including partisanship that controls for age and gender. I am
positing the effect on ideology on the P2 will remain, but not expecting differences to
emerge prior to this in the brainwave. The model includes an interaction term for
ideology and partisanship, because of the different meaning that people can give to these
terms and operates under the assumptions that these meanings have implications for
information processing when it comes to brain functionality. The lower order simple
effects of ideology and partisanship are also included. I hypothesize a simple effect of
ideology but not a simple effect of partisanship after controlling for age and gender. The
presumption is that people possess an ideology—especially when considered via Jost and
colleagues’ framework—but not necessarily a partisan attachment. An interactive effect
is presumed, such that the relationship between ideology and processing of emotion will
turn on partisan attachment. I propose that partisanship should enhance processing
efficiency for both ideological groups, but the lack of partisan attachment will slow
processing.
The research design and sample are exactly the same as above. A series of mixed
groups factorial ANCOVAs are performed to test the hypotheses and, where appropriate,
follow-up analyses are performed. Partisanship was measured on an eight-point scale
from strong Democrat to strong Republican, with an option for “other”. For the ensuing
analyses, this item was recoded to drop those who considered themselves as other.
Results
Before evaluating if ideology is uniquely related to processing of facial
information, it is important to test the assumption that ideology is related to partisanship.
Unsurprisingly, partisanship is related to ideology, (r=.650, p<.001) such that strong
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conservatives tend to have higher partisanship scores or a tendency to identify as strong
Republicans and strong liberals tend to have higher partisanship scores or a tendency to
identify as strong Democrats. This conforms to expectations.
The general linear model was used for these analyses.3 For the P1, using
Greenhouse-Geisser corrections, looking at within-subject effects, there is no simple
effect for emotion (F(3.302, 211.338)=1.164, p=.326, MSe=8.734), which is expected
because as mentioned earlier, facial emotions are not typically thought to have an impact
on the P1. Contrary to the hypothesis, however, there is a significant interaction between
emotion and ideology (F(3.302, 211.338)=2.603, p=.047, MSe=8.734). There is a
significant interaction between emotion and partisanship, (F(6.604, 211.338)=3.113,
p=.005, MSe=8.734). There is also a significant three-way interaction between emotion,
ideology, and partisanship, (F(6.604, 211.338)=2.38, p=.026, MSe=8.734).
LSD follow-ups (p=.05; LSDmmd=3.3614) reveal the pattern of this interaction.
Keep in mind that the following are automatic attentional differences, and they occur
quite early on in processing. For faces emoting anger, liberals who identify themselves as
Democrats are processing faster than conservatives who identify themselves as
Republicans (See Table 1, below). Liberals and conservatives, who identify themselves
as Independent, process at equivalent speeds.
Table 1: P1 Latency Responses to Angry Faces
Emotion: Angry
Partisanship
Democrat

3	
  SPSS

Liberals
93.8776
(n=14)

automatically centers variables in this model.	
  

Conservatives
91.333
(n=3)
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Independent

96.1619
(n=15)

96.0330
(n=13)

Republican

108.8571
(n=1)

97.3791
(n=26)

For disgusted faces, liberals who identify themselves as Democrats process faster
than conservatives who identify themselves as Republicans (See Table 2, below). Like
for angry faces, Independent liberals and conservatives process equivalently.
Table 2: P1 Latency Responses to Disgust Faces
Emotion: Disgust
Partisanship
Democrat
Independent
Republican

Liberals
95.2143
(n=14)
96.3429
(n=15)

Conservatives
93.2381
(n=3)
97.0220
(n=13)

107.1429
(n=1)

98.8242
(n=26)

For fear, the processing pattern is similar to anger and disgust. For faces emoting
fear, liberals who identify themselves as Democrats process faster than conservatives
who identify themselves as Republicans (See Table 3, below). Again, Independent
liberals and conservatives process equivalently.

Table 3: P1 Latency Responses to Fear Faces
Emotion: Fear
Partisanship
Democrat
Independent

Liberals
95.3673
(n=14)
98.5524
(n=15)

Conservatives
94.2857
(n=3)
97.2088
(n=13)
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Republican

103.8571
(n=1)

99.1923
(n=26)

For faces emoting happiness, the processing pattern is also similar; liberals who
identify themselves as Democrats process faster than conservatives who identify
themselves as Republicans (See Table 4, below). Similarly, Independent liberals and
conservatives process equivalently.
Table 4: P1 Latency Responses to Happy Faces
Emotion: Happy
Partisanship
Democrat
Independent
Republican

Liberals
93.6939
(n=14)
96.0381
(n=15)

Conservatives
91.0476
(n=3)
96.2308
(n=13)

96.8571
(n=1)

97.2692
(n=26)

For neutral faces, the processing pattern continues; liberals who identify
themselves as Democrats process faster than conservatives who identify themselves as
Republicans (See Table 5, below). Independent liberals and conservatives process
equivalently.

Table 5: P1 Latency Responses to Neutral Faces
Emotion: Neutral
Partisanship
Democrat
Independent

Liberals
93.6939
(n=14)
96.0381
(n=15)

Conservatives
91.0476
(n=3)
96.2308
(n=13)
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Republican

96.8571
(n=1)

97.2692
(n=26)

There are no between subjects effects for partisanship (F(2, 64)=1.105, p=.338,
MSe=421.586), ideology (1, 64)=.739, p=.396, MSe=421.586), or their interaction
(F(5,64)=.349, p=.706, MSe=421.586). This means there are no wholesale differences
across the emotions accounted for by ideology, partisanship, or their interaction at this
stage of processing.
Clearly these differences indicate there are processing differences and similarities
for liberals and conservatives which are conditional on partisanship at the P1. This
supports the general hypothesis that partisanship and ideology influence information
processing. If they are Independent, liberals and conservatives process similarly for all
emotions. If they are partisan, liberals tend to process all of the faces faster than do
conservatives. This is an intriguing, although unexpected finding. As indicated, the
differences between liberals who are Democrats and conservatives who are Republicans
occur irrespective of with they are presented. Given that this occurs at the P1, this is
strong evidence for the case that partisanship and ideology need to be considered
alongside of one another, because they have an interactive effect when it comes to how at
least facial information is automatically processed.
As hypothesized, using Greenhouse-Geisser corrections and looking at withinsubject effects for the N170, there is no simple effect for emotion (F(3.473,
197.978)=.489, p=.717, MSe=15.083). There is not a significant interaction between
emotion and ideology (F(3.473, 197.978)=.708, p=.568, MSe=15.083). There is a nonsignificant interaction between emotion and partisanship, (F(6.947, 197.978)=.263,
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p=.977, MSe=15.083). There is also no three-way interaction between emotion, ideology,
and partisanship, (F(6.947, 197.978)=.488, p=.841, MSe=15.083). This suggests there are
no discriminatory processing differences captured by ideology, partisanship, or their
interaction at this stage of processing.
For the P2, using Greenhouse-Geisser corrections and looking at within-subject
effects, there is no simple effect for emotion (F(3.667, 234.674)=.500, p=.720,
MSe=73.851). There is not a significant interaction between emotion and ideology
(F(3.667, 234.674)=.856, p=.483, MSe=73.851). There is no significant interaction
between emotion and partisanship, (F(7.334, 234.674)=.285, p=.964, MSe=73.851).
There is no three-way interaction between emotion, ideology, and partisanship, (F(7.334,
234.674)=.566, p=.791, MSe=73.851).
Interestingly, there is a significant relationship between subjects effect for
ideology, (F(4.469, 683.439, p=.038, MSe=683.439). Liberals’ mean response was
235.530 (Std err.=4.272) and conservatives’ mean response was 225.043 (Std
err.=2.628). An LSD follow-up (at p=.05) on this between-subjects simple effect
confirms there is a difference between liberals and conservatives processing at the P2
stage, with liberals being slower to process than conservatives. The pattern underlying the
simple effect is, however, misleading. Like in the first section of the project, liberals are
slower to respond to angry and neutral faces. One difference is that liberals process happy
faces at equivalent speeds as conservatives, whereas before they were significantly
different. They process the other faces equivalently. The general pattern is that
conservatives process faster than liberals, irrespective of emotion, although some of the
underlying effects that give rise to the ideology simple effect are not significant.
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Figure 3: Mean Conservative and Liberal Responses (in milliseconds) to Facial
Stimuli in the P2 Component
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Conclusion
With respect to the P1 components, the findings suggest an important difference
in the way conservatives and liberals initially process information when partisanship is
taken into account. This was not an expected finding given the early and nearly automatic
nature of these components. That being said, the finding is a demonstration of the
combined influence of ideology and partisanship on information processing. Liberals
initially process facial information more rapidly than conservatives irrespective of
emotion but, throughout the course of processing, conservatives process the facial
information faster. Recall that the P1 reflects obligatory, automatic differences, so
individual differences are not expected to impact the waveform at this point. Normally,
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marked differences prompt such differences at the P1. For instance, people who have
high social anxiety, which becomes a biological property of the way they process
information, over-attend and devote many resources to processing, so this can manifest
itself at the P1 stage (Mühlberger et al., 2009; Mueller et al., 2009; Wieser et al., 2009;
Rossignol et al., 2007, 2012; Sehlmeyer et al., 2010). This is not the case for those with
lower social anxiety, whose brainwaves at the P1 would not show such a pattern.
The P2 component is where more individual differences (top-down effects) are
expected to matter, so people’s beliefs, life experiences, and so forth can impact the way
they process information. Notably, this is still quite automatic in nature, which is why
findings at this point in the wave are a fairly robust measure for how individual
differences can become automated and produce processing differences. For the P2, the
results indicate conservatives process dominant emotions more quickly compared to
liberals. This fits with what was found above, because the pattern of similarities and
differences between liberals and conservatives do not flip. In fact, because this result was
obtained in a more robust model, and it stands out as a stand-alone between-groups
factor; one can be fairly confident that ideology is unique, deep marker for processing
differences as well as biological differences between individuals.
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The Link Between Political Participation and Faces
Ideological and partisan differences exist for how faces are processed, but it also
stands to reason that political participation may correlate with facial processing
differences. Political participation, in this project, refers to four basic categories: voting,
campaign activities, contacting government officials, and local community activities
(Verba & Nie, 1987; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). As people scan their
environment, they unconsciously evaluate that environment for emotional significance,
discerning emotional states and friend from foe. This provides information crucial for
adaptive behavior, providing immediate information about the emotional states of others.
This information gathering process could manifest itself and apply to many kinds of
participatory behavior: voting, contacting officials, discussing politics, and taking part in
campaign activities. If faces really are one of the bases for human’s social interaction and
they shape behaviors, then how people process faces is relevant to political behaviors.
This chapter is structured by two general questions: one, is political participation
related to facial processing and, two, do those who participate less in politics exhibit
signs that it is costly for them to process facial information? This section argues that
facial information is pivotal to both social interaction and political participation.
However, even though people are quite adept at interpreting and recognizing faces and
extracting salient social information from their environment, it does not follow that
people experience similar costs to engage in facial processing. So even though many take
for granted their ability to interpret and process faces, cognitive resources are expended
which allow people to perform such tasks. For some people, however, these costs are
quite high. Broadly, this work asserts one potential explanation for why some participate
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less: it is costly for them to partake in even basic, fundamental social interaction. Low
participators expend many cognitive resources to process faces, a pattern consistent with
those with have high anxiety.
When attempting to unearth and discover why political participation had changed
or declined in the U.S., Putnam (2001) settled on the notion that people were engaging
less with one another: they were bowling alone. He found participation was floundering
in cornerstones of American democracy such as civic organizations and churches, among
many others. Political participation was not just declining, many forms of participation
were. Putnam attributed the decline in political participation to a lack of bonding and
bridging social capital, the consequence of which was the deterioration of the social and
political fabric of the U.S. At the heart of his observations and theory, Putnam asserted
that the connections people form with one another are powerful, even central to the
balance and vitality of American democracy.
Well before Putnam, scholars have searched for the reasons why people do and do
not participate in politics. The general framework for their conclusions turns on the
benefits and costs of political participation. Rational views of voting behavior raise the
question of why people even vote when the costs likely outweigh the benefits (Downs,
1957). One explanation is that social norms foster a desire to participate, enervating an
inner desire to appease others and live up to social expectations, which then confers
social benefits like a positive image of one’s self while harming those who do not
participate (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Knack, 1992; Panagopoulos, 2010). In some sense,
some people develop a sense of political efficacy, a psychological desire to participate in
politics, because they then derive some kind of pleasure or develop a stronger self-image;
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of course, this also affects those who tend not to participate, where the social pressure
may disenfranchise and make them alienated from politics (Finifter 1970; Milbrath &
Goel, 1977; Seeman, 1959). The underlying theory is that people respond to others’
perceptions and social pressure, and they want to project a socially desirable image of
themselves or avoid shame (Buffacchi, 2001; Coleman, 1988, 1990; Knack, 1992;
Panagopoulos, 2010; Posner & Rasmusen, 1999; Tadelis). In a field experiment, Gerber
et al. (2008) tests this theory and shows that social pressure—publicizing people’s voting
records— is a powerful tool, one that can impel people to vote; another article confirms
other uses of this paradigm, especially face to face canvassing with these voter records to
fuel voter participation (Davenport, 2010). In essence, prompting emotional reactions,
either a sense of pride and accomplishment or shame, can be a powerful force driving
behavior (Brader, 2005; Marcus et al., 2000; Neuman et al., 2007; Valentino et al., 2011).
The drawback, in this case, is when social pressure is exerted, people may respond
differently. Eliciting positive emotions, like pride, may stimulate participation, while
negative emotions may prompt anxiety (Panagopoulos, 2010). Although inducing
reactions to social pressure may increase participation, particularly voting, there is a
potential pitfall at play. People will respond to social pressures differently, because there
are important individual differences. At minimum, how to entice people to participate in
politics hinges on human interaction.
Though much of the aforementioned work has provided crucial advancements in
knowledge and theory, I posit an additional explanation and theory regarding why some
people participate in politics and others do not. Previous work takes for granted the
necessary social skills and basic interactive mechanisms that can even lead someone to
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respond to social pressure, let alone the social pressure that those who participate less in
politics may already experience. I am not referring to the variety of factors that enhance
the likelihood to participate in politics, such as: free time, money, civic skills, and
education (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). In fact, what I refer to is much more
basic, although an overlooked element of social interaction, the ability of people to
process and interpret facial information. A large proportion of the literature seems to
assume that basic social skills are in place and are shared by most people. In truth, the
equipment is in place, but the costs to use it are not as stable as one might presume.
Those who do not participate in politics may experience a great deal of social pressure
already, perhaps more than just in politics but social life in general. If this is the case,
those who tend to participate less may experience a form of anxiety, raising their costs to
participate. This is a salient point to consider, because it is an often-noted conclusion that
voting bears a lower cost relative to the other kinds of participation listed above (Verba &
Nie, 1972, 1987; Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995).
Some of the literature mentioned in other chapters, highlighted that facial
information is used for decisions regarding competency, trustworthiness, and a host of
other factors. Indeed, presentation of faces alone predicts election outcomes better than
chance (Todorov et al., 2005; Ballew and Todorov, 2007; Olivia & Todorov, 2010). Few,
if any, seem to contest that facial information is relevant to political participation. If it is
as Putnam argues, that social interactions and connections are the bedrock of political
participation and even democracy, then the most basic element of this process is how
people are processing and viewing others’ faces, and using them to either engage or
disengage in the social/political arena.
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An additional consideration is that politics may be stressful and, in particular,
prompt anxiety, which may hinder an individual’s ability to process information and
participate in politics (Stanton et al., 2010; Waismel-Manor et al., 2011; French et al.,
2011). Political participation requires social interaction, which can produce social anxiety
for some. So it is fair to expect that social anxiety, which is an emotional disposition,
may color political attitudes and behaviors (Miller, 2009). For instance, those with high
social anxiety tend to be cautious in their interactions with others and minimize human
interaction; social anxiety can also cause autonomic arousal, characterized by
nervousness (Miller, 2009). Accordingly, social anxiety may quell political participation,
especially as the interaction costs increase with more individually taxing political
behaviors, from voting to say contacting public officials or discussing politics.
There is an issue in the literature here that must be observed. It is known that
anxiety, among other emotional reactions, impact political attitudes and behaviors
(Huddy et al., 2005; Jost et al., 2007; Jost et al., 2003; Ladd, 2008; Marcus et al., 2000;
Nueman et al., 2007). The argument is emotion, such as anxiety, is infused into
information updating or processing (Marcus et al., 2000; Lodge & Taber, 2000, 2005;
Taber & Lodge, 2006). The assumption is that as a person is exposed to information, it is
evaluated via a combination of memory infused with affect, coloring interpretation of
political information and evaluations of candidates. Some also argue anxiety spurs
attention, encouraging those who are anxious to pay more attention and even make better
decisions (Lau & Redlawsk, 1997; Lau, Anderson, & Redlawsk, 2008). The reality is
more complicated, nevertheless. Anxiety is involved in information processing, but it has
a conditional ability to enhance attention and improve decisions.
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Anxiety, especially social anxiety, is a double-edge sword when it comes to
information processing. As already noted, social anxiety can lead to a withdrawal from
social interactions, but it also can lead to hyper-attention and expending too many
cognitive resources. Redlawsk et al. (2010) propose there is an affective tipping point, at
which point people avoid evaluating new information. Similar to this line of thinking,
there is an automatic affective tipping point in information processing, such that a certain
level of (social) anxiety may stymie one’s ability to participate in politics. Social anxiety
produces stress, which increases cortisol levels and literally inhibits the ability of the
brain to process information (Gazzaniga, 2009). On one hand, this argument accepts that
a certain level of anxiety may increase attention, but, on the other, recognizes there are
limitations to the benefits of anxiety. High levels of anxiety or attention (over-attending)
may overtax a system, expending too many cognitive resources, in which case the one of
the few options for someone is to withdraw to re-establish equilibrium.
Many ERP studies establish a connection between social anxiety and biased
information processing of faces (Kolassa et al., 2007, 2009; Mühlberger et al., 2009;
Mueller et al., 2009; Wieser et al., 2009; Rossignol et al., 2012; Sehlmeyer et al., 2010).
To somewhat simplify this body of work, they find increased P1 amplitude to both
neutral and emotional faces is related to high social anxiety, so those with high social
anxiety automatically over-attend and devote many resources to processing compared to
those with lower social anxiety (Kolassa et al., 2007, 2009; Mühlberger et al., 2009;
Mueller et al., 2009; Wieser et al., 2009; Rossignol et al., 2012; Sehlmeyer et al., 2010).
Socially anxious individuals are, thus, drawn to emotional faces and this reaction to
emotional faces can be unproductive. Socially anxious individuals’ hyper-attentiveness
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can abate their desire to be in social situations, even prompt them to avoid new
experiences or new ideas (Miller, 2009). Obviously, in the context, of political
participation, experiencing high amounts of anxiety can be counter-productive, meaning
people partake less in politics.
Pulling everything from above together, the hypothesis is those who are less
prone to participate in politics are more socially anxious and their P1 waveform will
exhibit this social anxiety with increased amplitude, which means more attentiveness.
Given that some kinds of participation require more interaction or are more individually
cumbersome, it is also expected that the increased attention will be more strongly related
to activities that require more social interaction, so higher order participation than voting
itself.
This portion of the project analyzes the same ERP data as the previous sections.
In total, the same 105 people participated in the ERP and TST experiments. In addition to
considering different forms of political participation, it analyses cortisol data collected
form a Trier Stress Test (TST). The subjects participated in the two phases of the
experiment—the ERP experiment and the TST. Although there were not survey questions
squarely addressing social anxiety, cortisol serves as an adequate proxy for two reasons.
The first is the purpose of the TST, which is to place individuals in a socially stressful
situation—prepare a speech and perform arithmetic, among others. Accordingly, the
design fuels social pressure. Put alternatively, as one undergoes the TST, anxiety is
expected to increase as the experiment progresses (Hellhammer & Schubert, 2011).
Cortisol may index how anxiety increases, which is routinely collected as part of the TST
(Hellhammer & Schubert, 2011). Second, surveys regarding social anxiety somewhat

47
miss the mark on capturing the anxiety that individuals directly experience. Cortisol
measures tap into the increase in anxiety that individuals experience and, therefore, is a
more direct measure of anxiety than a survey might be—though the relevant survey items
and cortisol levels typically are correlated but this varies somewhat depending on if the
survey was administered prior to or after the stress test (Hellhammer & Schubert, 2011).
Political participation is broken down into voting and non-voting. Actual voting
records were obtained, so this is not self-reported voting behavior. Actual voting is
composed of three elections—the general 2008 election, 2006 midterm, and the 2008
primary election. Non-voting is composed of participants’ yes/no responses, with yes
coded higher, if they: attended a political rally, contributed money to a campaign, worked
on a campaign, and contacted elected officials. It also includes how often they discussed
politics, which if they talked very often was a one, and each degree of talking less being a
fraction of one.
Results
French et al. (2012) already analyzed some of the cortisol data and how they
relate to political participation. They report baseline cortisol levels are negatively
correlated with voting frequency and non-voting political participation. Since they use
baseline cortisol, however, it is necessary to see if there is a relationship between how
much cortisol increases, which is a better index of anxiety experienced during the
experiment. Using the square root of max cortisol to correct for skewness and after
trimming two outliers (n=103), there is a negative linear relationship (r=-.21, p<.05)
between max cortisol and non-voting political participation. There is a negative linear
relationship between actual voting and max cortisol, (r=-.395, p<.001) which mirrors
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what French et al. (2012) found with baseline cortisol. The max cortisol is positively
correlated with P1 amplitude, but only in response to certain faces (See Table 6, below).
Max cortisol is positively related to P1 amplitude of disgust and fear on the two-tailed
level, and neutral on the one-tailed level. This fits what was hypothesized above, which
was that higher cortisol levels (as an index of experienced social anxiety) are related to
larger P1 amplitudes of neutral and some emotional faces. Most of the other studies do
not employ as many emotions in their experiments; they typically compare one emotion
to neutral, such as fear or disgust, though some do argue that social anxiety occurs in
response to all social stimuli (Kolassa et al., 2007, 2009). As for participation, it is clear
that there is a difference drawn around the kind of participation that is being considered.
Actual voting is not correlated with P1 amplitudes, whereas other more socially taxing
kinds of participation are.
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Table 6: Correlations Between Cortisol, Non-Voting and Voting Participation with
P1 Amplitude
Anger

Disgust

Fear

Happy

Neutral

.148
.210

.274
.019

.234
.046

.141
.235

.205
.085

r
p
(n=83)
VotingParticipation

-.224
.042

-.250
.022

-.166
.134

-.225
.041

-.215
.051

r
p
(n=78)

-.090
.434

-.082
.478

-.064
.580

-.064
.579

-.036
.756

Max
Cortisol
r
p
(n=73)
Non-Voting
Participation

Discussion
Although these are just correlations between cortisol levels and processing of
faces, it is quite clear that there is a relationship between stress and/or anxiety
experienced during the Trier Stress Test (TST) and information processing. Given the
relationship between non-voting participation and max cortisol, it stands to reason that
those who are devoting more attentional resources to process the faces are also those who
experience more stress and anxiety during the TST. These people tend to not participate
in non-voting kinds of political participation, which have higher social costs than voting.
This fits with what many have argued regarding the different kinds of political
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participation and the costs associated with them (Verba & Nie, 1972, 1987; Verba,
Scholzman, & Brady, 1995).
As delineated above, others have argued that attention may increase with anxiety
and stress, which literally is the case (if P1 amplitudes increase, this means attention
increases). However, for those who this happens to, they tend to not participate in certain
forms of politics. Given that this occurs at the P1 stage, it suggests these individuals
internalize the pressure and respond to it by allocating more resources, but this comes at a
cost. This is an obligatory, automatic difference in the allocation of cognitive resources,
meaning these individuals may experience social anxiety and stress. Also, since higher
cortisol levels are obtained for them, it is possible that these kinds of people remove
themselves from politics because of how taxing, it may be for them to participate in
politics and to pay attention to politics. I have argued this phenomenon is likely the
double-edged sword of social anxiety, where attention might increase but it might also
lead to a decrease in more socially taxing forms of political participation.
Although the discipline has recognized that different kinds of political
participation require more from people and there are many theories regarding why people
even participate in politics, there still is a lack of understanding why some people do not
participate in politics (Plutzer, 2002). A compelling explanation is that politics is too
costly for them—time, money, education, getting away from work, etc—and not worth
the social benefits (Verba & Nie, 1972, 1987; Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995). For
future research, it is now appropriate to consider the differential costs for individuals in
terms of their emotional and interpersonal dispositions like social anxiety. It seems that
the costs for socially anxious people to participate in politics may be heightened because
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of already high social costs for them to be social, or they feel and experience the social
pressure of politics differently than those who do participate. In many respects, it may be
cost prohibitive for socially anxious people to participate in politics.
Politics may be quite stressful for those who do not participate. Some have argued
those do not participate almost lack an emotional connection to politics (Lewis-Beck et
al., 2008). It may well be the case, however, that politics evokes too much emotion—
stress and anxiety—which turns them away from certain kinds of politics. Future research
should explore this notion because, if some are driven away from politics because of the
social costs, it is necessary to not only confirm this, but also find ways to lower those
social costs.
There are weaknesses with some of the measures employed in this section and
one in particular should be noted. The cortisol measures employed here indexes stress
and anxiety, and given the nature of the experience, this is likely social. However, it is a
proxy measure for social anxiety. Future research should consider the role of social
anxiety as a hindrance to political participation, but likely do so with cortisol measures as
well as different scales that predict anxiety. Although those with higher cortisol levels
were experiencing more anxiety or stress, it is impossible to tell given the measures of
this study if that is more a trait-state difference, the situation, or an interaction of the two.
Future designs should take this into account. As indicated above, since others have found
a relationship between increased P1 amplitudes and anxiety, we can remain confident in
this project’s cortisol findings as an index of anxiety and how cortisol relates to low
participation.
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Conclusion
The brain is an important frontier for political science research. Politics is in the
brain; it is a part of who people are and how they process information. Future research
needs to be conducted in this vein, to say, see how citizens process information from
elites, how individual differences matter at this stage, and then how this affects people’s
political attitudes and behavior.
However, it is necessary to study these things are directly as possible. Studying
the brain at the speed it functions opens the door to directly studying concepts long since
considered in political science research—information processing. Not to mention, it is a
viable tool for detecting differences when observed behaviors are the same—such as
correctly categorizing a face. This project has demonstrated processing differences exist
even when behavioral responses are equivalent. This is a resounding finding that cannot
be ignored. It shows that more is occurring underneath the surface of a behavior.
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Appendix I- A Sample of Faces Employed
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